Retrospective traces / 200 traces
Provider releases and methodologies, filings, rules, model documents, exits and fund economics behind the venture market, each carrying its provider, period, scope and revision state.
Historical event dates and source dates are separate from the preparation date of this local edition. Every trace is a retrospective draft prepared 16 September 2026; none was published on its historical date.
200 traces
NVCA's 2026 Yearbook covers full-year 2025 venture activity, credited throughout to PitchBook, a Morningstar company.
The Q2 2026 Venture Pulse PDF credits KPMG Private Enterprise's analysis of PitchBook data; its web pages do not.
BlackRock announced the $3.2 billion Preqin deal on 30 June 2024; Preqin's own page now dates it to 2025.
First Citizens continues SVB's semiannual venture report, pairing proprietary client data with licensed PitchBook figures.
LSEG's Refinitiv acquisition closed 29 January 2021; its own pages do not say venture-data definitions survived unchanged.
Carta's own data pages say its round and valuation figures come from aggregated, anonymized data of its own customers only.
The 2026 Scoreboard's own annex says its two commercial VC sources classify investment stages differently from each other.
JPMorgan's own release dates the Aumni acquisition to March 2023, and Aumni's platform is now being wound down.
PitchBook's fundraising methodology attributes a fund's entire committed capital to the quarter it finally closed.
The Bank's own endnotes show its regional equity Tracker runs on Beauhurst's data and stage definitions, not a Bank-collected count.
Beauhurst's own FAQ describes the eight triggers and filing-review method it uses to track UK, German and Irish private companies.
Bpifrance's own history and Le Lab methodology page show the 2013 merger created one institution that both finances and studies French business.
SEBI's own 2012 regulation and quarterly AIF data separate a fund's committed capital from capital actually invested.
VEC's own pages describe a yen-denominated, survey-based Yearbook whose English edition carries only a data excerpt.
CVCA's own H1 2026 report states its Canadian-dollar figures come from its proprietary database and are subject to revision.
LAVCA's own methodology page shows its Latin America totals are built market by market, not as one regional figure.
AVCA's own Q2 2026 summary and Data and Intelligence page show its Africa venture figures rest on a decade-old proprietary fund-manager database.
Cambridge Associates' own methodology names its US Venture Capital Index calculation a pooled horizon internal rate of return, not a simple average.
Cambridge Associates defines vintage year by a fund's first LP contribution, a cohort cut distinct from its calendar-period pooled index.
SEC filings and Burgiss's own archived pages show what changed, and what did not, when MSCI completed its 2023 acquisition of the private-markets data firm.
An archived State Street page describes a defunct private equity index built from the firm's own custodial cash-flow records, not general partner surveys.
Renaissance Capital's 2024 annual review states its own IPO count's footnoted scope, which differs from any venture database's exit tally.
Nasdaq Private Market's own reporting separates its platform's settled trades from a larger secondary-market figure it only cites from elsewhere.
Meritech's own 2024 note describes its public SaaS comps method, and its comps table has since moved behind a signed-in analytics product.
Jay Ritter's University of Florida page states what its own posted IPO datasets cover, an academic archive distinct from a commercial data subscription.
The SEC's 2020 order approving NYSE's primary direct listing rule states exactly what changed, for which exchange, and for which kind of listing.
The jointly governed GICS methodology states a numeric revenue rule for public companies that a private-market provider's sector label does not carry.
CalPERS's own 2026 board review reports vehicle-level IRR, TVPI and lag conventions across a $119.3 billion program.
WSIB's own quarterly schedule gives fund-by-fund IRR and warns that interim returns are not comparable across ages.
Oregon Treasury's quarterly PE schedule names every fund by vintage year and states plainly what its IRR figures cannot support.
TRS's own financial report gives a lagged, blended private equity return and names venture managers without a separate venture figure.
UC's own annual report gives a 24.9% private equity weight for one endowment pool without separating out venture capital.
Yale's fiscal 2025 announcement and endowment data name leveraged buyouts and real estate but no venture capital figure.
The Comptroller's own monthly transaction reports name new private equity commitments and terms, not fund-level performance.
CalSTRS's own performance schedule lists venture funds by vintage year while stating its IRRs are interim and GP-unapproved.
MassPRIM's own financial report gives a lagged, program-wide private equity return with venture capital named but not isolated.
The SEC's own instructions show a registered adviser's brochure duties differ sharply from an exempt reporting adviser's limited filing.
The SEC's own instructions and adopting release set a 150 million dollar filing threshold and describe Form PF as filed on a confidential basis.
The SEC's adopting release sets five conjunctive conditions a fund must meet before its adviser can skip registration.
Rule 204-4 and Form ADV's own instructions limit an exempt reporting adviser to seven Part 1A items and no client brochure.
The SEC's adopting release states its merged advertising rule binds registered advisers only, not exempt reporting advisers.
The 2011 directive's own text requires authorisation, reporting and a marketing passport, but leaves transposition to each Member State.
The 2024 amending directive adds loan-origination and delegation rules while leaving most of the 2011 AIFMD text untouched.
The 2013 statute transposes AIFMD's core definitions while also splitting funds into professional-only and retail categories of its own.
ILPA's own 2019 edition frames alignment, governance and transparency as recommended terms for LPs to negotiate, not requirements.
ILPA's own pages show a 2025 reporting template phasing in alongside the 2016 version it is meant to replace, both voluntary.
ILPA's 2023 continuation-fund guidance sets a status quo test and an LPAC role, and its own page shows a 2026 revision underway.
Jefferies' 2025 secondary market review reports a $240 billion volume figure drawn from its own advisory practice, not a market census.
StepStone's own outlook pages describe secondary market conditions qualitatively, without the volume figure a Jefferies or Setter Capital report states.
Setter Capital's FY 2025 survey puts secondary volume at $203.76 billion and states it excludes venture company-share secondaries entirely.
Hercules Capital's FY 2025 10-K states a 3-to-20 percent warrant coverage range, a 12.9 percent yield, and portfolio detail as of 31 December 2025.
TriplePoint Venture Growth's FY 2025 10-K discloses a 2-to-10 percent warrant coverage range and a 13.7 percent portfolio yield.
Trinity Capital's and Runway Growth's FY 2025 10-Ks state their own yields and equity positions, each on its own definitions.
Syntiant Corp's SEC-filed loan agreement sets warrant coverage on a sliding scale, later documented at 15 and 10 percent by its own amendment.
Cooley GO's own guidance lists eight concepts in a venture debt term sheet, framed as questions to negotiate rather than a lender's stated offer.
The FDIC's press release and First Citizens' own 8-K give different asset and deposit figures for the same March 2023 SVB acquisition.
The EIF's European Small Business Finance Outlook pairs its own SME index with Invest Europe's differently-scoped venture and private equity statistics.
The EIF's own InvestEU pages describe a guarantee-backed, intermediary-only equity mandate with a thematic eligibility test for fund managers.
IFC's Access to Information Policy sets a 30- or 60-day pre-board disclosure window for each proposed investment, including venture and growth equity.
Temasek's 2025 Review states a S$434 billion net portfolio value at 31 March 2025 but folds venture-type exposure into a broader technology sector bracket.
GIC's 2025/26 report details a dedicated early-stage Technology Investment Group while disclosing only three broad asset classes at portfolio level.
In-Q-Tel's own history and milestones pages describe a 1999 founding as an independent not-for-profit, with typical deal sizes but no disclosed fund size.
Mubadala's own pages disclose named 2025 transactions and a broad asset-class mix, neither of which states a portfolio-level venture allocation.
Launched in 2018 with a GBP 2.5bn commitment, British Patient Capital's own pages describe fund commitments and portfolio co-investment, not direct pitches.
The SBA's own SBIC program pages set four license types and leverage caps, only some of which behave like venture-equity financing.
ISIF's 2023 annual report extract lists specific venture-fund commitments under a statutory double-bottom-line mandate, distinct from its 4.3 percent return.
The IPEV Board publishes recommended Fair Value methodology; its own text says standards do not require it be followed.
ASC 820, issued as Statement 157 in 2006, distinguishes observable Level 1 prices from unobservable Level 3 estimates.
AICPA's own product page describes its compensation-valuation guide as professional guidance now under revision, not an IRS regulation.
AICPA's fund-level valuation guide for VC and PE portfolio holdings is a separate, nonauthoritative document from its compensation guide.
Section 409A's 2004 enactment, a 2005 interim IRS notice and a later Treasury regulation are three distinct layers of authority.
The SEC's own 2018 release doubled Rule 701's disclosure threshold to $10 million without eliminating the disclosure it triggers.
The statute and the IRS's new Form 15620 both fix a 30-day, non-extendable deadline that cannot be revoked without IRS consent.
A July 2025 amendment gave stock acquired after that date a tiered exclusion and a higher cap, leaving older stock under the old rule.
Carta's own guide names a real 20-business-day SEC minimum, then layers pricing and eligibility recommendations that are not rules.
Airbnb's 2020 filings disclose several option exercise prices set years apart, from $3.18 to $49.77, against a $68.00 IPO price.
The SEC's 2015 Regulation Crowdfunding release created Form C, the disclosure filing a Title III issuer must make, distinct from a full prospectus.
The SEC staff's 2019 report to the Commission counts Regulation Crowdfunding offerings and dollars from May 2016 through 2018, not any other exemption.
The SEC's 2015 Regulation A rules require a qualified Tier 2 offering circular and ongoing reports, with qualification stated as no judgment on merit.
Boxabl's January 2021 Form 1-A offering circular on EDGAR sets a stated maximum offering, price and risk disclosures, not a reported amount raised.
FINRA's funding portal rules, effective January 2016, bar portals from advice or solicitation and register them apart from broker-dealers.
Y Combinator's own deal page, read in September 2026, still structures its standard investment as two SAFEs totaling $500,000.
Techstars' own published terms price its standard deal at $220,000 split between an uncapped SAFE and a convertible equity agreement.
500 Global's and Alchemist's own program pages price a seed accelerator seat differently, one by percentage, one by net proceeds after tuition.
AngelList's own pricing page bundles a Roll Up Vehicle into a subscription tier rather than selling it as a single flat fee.
Wefunder's and Republic's own homepages report separate self-reported totals that should not be added into a single crowdfunding figure.
The Labor Department's 1979 investment-duties rule weighs a plan's whole portfolio, not each holding, and never names venture capital.
Public Law 95-600 raised the capital-gains deduction to 60 percent and repealed the alternative tax; the statute never uses the word Steiger.
Baker Library's Doriot collection records ARD as a 1946 Boston firm; a Computer History Museum document ties it to DEC's 1957 funding pitch.
Public Law 96-477 added the business development company category to the Investment Company Act of 1940, a wrapper used far beyond venture debt.
Title 6, Chapter 17 of the Delaware Code limits a fund's limited partners' liability, and it has been rewritten many times since first codified.
Sequoia's site states its 1972 founding and founder by name; Kleiner Perkins' page describes only five decades, without a year or a founder.
NVCA describes itself as the venture industry's advocacy voice for roughly 400 member firms, without stating a founding year on its own pages.
Finance Act 1983 gave income tax relief up to £40,000 a year for shares in unquoted trading companies, later named the Business Expansion Scheme.
Release 33-9415 lifted the general-solicitation ban only for accredited-only offerings under new Rule 506(c), leaving Rule 506(b) unchanged.
Public Law 85-699 let the SBA buy subordinated debentures in licensed small business investment companies, a leverage structure, not a grant.
S&P Capital IQ Pro's private-capital coverage combines With Intelligence data with S&P's own private-company database.
Innovate Finance's own Capital and Investment Programme publishes a fintech-specific investment series separate from general UK venture statistics.
Startup Genome's own methodology page shows its ecosystem ranking is a weighted composite score, not a national venture-funding total.
ISBI's own annual report gives a blended private equity return and a third-party ranking, with venture capital folded inside both.
A 1996 SEC prospectus restates Netscape's August 1995 IPO price at $14 a share, adjusted for a stock split that happened five months later.
Two SEC-filed 2000-2001 shareholder reports pin the Nasdaq's exact top; NVCA's own history gives only a qualitative venture-side decline.
The 2002 statute and a 2006 SEC advisory report show compliance costs and a slower path from venture funding to IPO, without proving a single cause.
YC's archived 2005 page set a $6,000-per-founder stipend and a range-priced valuation; its current site shows how far the standard deal has grown.
AngelList's own 2013 announcement and help pages set syndicate carry, and its current site shows the same mechanic renamed as an SPV.
SoftBank's own 2017 announcement and its 2026 annual report show how a single fund's headline numbers move as its life continues.
The August 2019 registration statement and September withdrawal show what public disclosure required that private funding rounds did not.
Crunchbase's global 2021 total and the PitchBook-NVCA US-only total differ by scope, not by error, and neither is a single market truth.
The FDIC's closure notice, the Fed's own review, and a joint Treasury statement show what changed for depositors and what regulators later found.
PitchBook's own methodology page explains how it estimates late-arriving deals before a quarter's total is treated as settled.
Crunchbase's methodology page and two consecutive reports show how its global funding count is built and later revised.
CB Insights' State of Venture 2024 report and its public unicorn definitions show a third counting method for one market.
Dealroom's own data methodology and a 2026 report show how a Europe-heavy provider defines and verifies a funding round.
Invest Europe's member survey put 2024 European venture investment at €18 billion, a different construction than database data.
Two consecutive Crunchbase reports show Q4 2024 global funding move from $93 billion to $96 billion as more deals surfaced.
Crunchbase, CB Insights and PitchBook each report a different AI share of 2024 dollars, built on different definitions.
CB Insights, Crunchbase, PitchBook and Dealroom each show recent periods where a few mega-rounds drove most reported growth.
CB Insights' 2024 report shows deal counts falling while quarterly dollars rose, and two providers explain why counts revise more.
A €410 billion European dry-powder figure blends private equity and venture capital, showing why the term needs its scope stated.
A standard SAFE and the model financing documents show why the option pool sits inside pre-money, and why founders should compute it themselves.
Carta's own reports state three different 2024 medians by stage, each valid for its stated quarter, sample and definition.
Carta's own data separates the all-rounds down-round rate from the primary-only rate, and both are shown receding from a 2024 peak.
CB Insights and Crunchbase both value unicorns at their last priced round, and Carta's own data shows how old that mark can get.
Forge and Nasdaq Private Market both blend several inputs into a daily price, and neither claims to be a round.
Treasury's safe-harbor rules and a valuation provider's own guide explain why the two numbers are rarely the same.
Carta's own data shows the median seed valuation rising from $10M to $20M since 2018, with no fixed definition of what counts as seed.
Carta's own data shows bridge rounds rising from about 12% to nearly 17% of dollars raised, and defines what counts as one.
OpenAI's and Anthropic's own announcements show rounds large enough to change how a provider's quarterly total reads.
Two companies' own posts show what a round announcement states as fact and what it leaves for the reader to assume.
Y Combinator's own documents show how the 2013 SAFE works and what its 2018 post-money redesign changed.
NVCA's own model documents page shows what the free templates cover and how often they are revised.
Cooley GO's guides show how a valuation cap and a discount convert a note, and which one a document lets govern.
NVCA's model certificate shows the exact liquidation-preference formula and its non-participating design.
NVCA's model charter's weighted-average formula, compared with the rarer full-ratchet alternative Cooley GO defines.
NVCA's and Y Combinator's own documents show how a pro rata right is defined, and when it expires.
NVCA's model voting agreement and charter show how board seats and blocking rights are actually assigned.
Cooley GO's guide and the tax rule show how early exercise, vesting and the 83(b) election fit together.
NVCA's financing agreement and YC's own SAFE math show why the option pool dilutes founders specifically.
A lender's own 10-K and the 2023 bank failure record show how venture debt pairs warrants with covenants.
Renaissance Capital's own annual counts and the SEC's SPAC-inclusive tally measure the same years differently.
Carta's own M&A counts dwarf its IPO counts among venture-backed startups, and neither report totals a price.
ILPA's formal definition and Carta's fund data show why total value and distributions move at different speeds.
An NBER study of financing rounds and current fund data both show returns concentrated in a small share of outcomes.
The SEC's own tally shows SPAC IPOs collapsing from 613 in 2021 to 31 in 2023, then it tightened disclosure rules.
ILPA's 2023 guidance sets terms for GP-led sales that can return LP cash without an independent buyer.
Spotify and Slack listed without underwriters or proceeds, then the NYSE rule they used was rewritten.
IPEV's fair-value rules and SoftBank's own 2022 loss show how private marks are built and how far they can move.
NVCA's model charter language and Carta's waterfall explainer show why a big exit can still pay common stock little.
Carta's own quarterly shutdown data rose sharply through 2024, and Carta says the count still understates failures.
Regulation D exempts most rounds from registration, and Form D discloses the fact of a sale without its price or terms.
The 2020 amendments added new qualifying categories but left the income and net worth thresholds exactly where they were.
The SEC's 2020 release raised the Regulation Crowdfunding limit from 1.07 million to 5 million dollars, effective March 2021.
The SEC adopted private fund adviser rules in 2023, and the Fifth Circuit vacated the entire rule in 2024 for exceeding SEC authority.
FIRRMA extended national security review to certain non-controlling investments, and 2020 rules define what that covers.
A 2025 Treasury rule prohibits or requires notice for certain US investments in Chinese semiconductor, quantum and AI firms.
The National Security and Investment Act created a mandatory notification regime that took effect in January 2022.
EuVECA gives qualifying venture funds a single cross-border marketing passport under a lighter regulatory regime.
The 2023 FTC-DOJ guidelines describe when acquiring a smaller rival counts as eliminating a nascent competitive threat.
The FTC's 2025 HSR form required far more disclosure, until a 2026 court ruling reinstated the earlier form.
Carta's own data shows the median gap between rounds by stage, and why one blended number can hide how much it moved.
What default alive means, how to compute it from the bank balance, and the runway point past which options narrow.
The Burn Multiple divides burn by new revenue; the sources show what a good ratio looks like and what it cannot diagnose.
Carta's own dilution data shows a multi-year decline by stage, and why its dataset does not count every dilutive event.
YC's SAFE and a priced round set ownership differently; the documents show when each actually serves a founder.
YC's model Series A term sheet and a law firm's guide show which lines carry the most long-term cost.
A cap-table provider's guide and a syndicate platform's LP guide show what belongs in an update and how often to send one.
Revenue-based lenders' own published terms show what founders keep and what the capital costs against equity.
SBIR's own award caps and the UK's R&D relief test show what qualifies, and the time both programmes require.
An editorial checklist built from YC's fundraising guides on what the documents suggest a founder should check before signing.
ILPA's own principles define fees and carried interest without fixing the percentages market shorthand assumes.
NVCA's own data on average versus median fund size shows how much a large fund must extract from a single winner.
NVCA's own dataset records US fund-level fundraising falling from $222.7 billion in 2022 to $67.0 billion in 2025.
NVCA's own data shows first-time funds falling from 457 in 2021 to 101 in 2025, faster than the overall fund count.
NVCA's own data shows corporate involvement in a minority of deals but a majority of dollars raised.
SoftBank's own report shows Vision Fund investment falling 93% in one year, alongside NVCA's own valuation series.
UNH's national estimate and ACA's member report use different methods, so their angel figures should not be combined.
Harvard's own report states a 14% venture line for fiscal 2025; Yale's own release states a return but no venture figure.
CalPERS and CalSTRS each publish fund-level IRRs but warn their own methods are not comparable to another LP's.
Two firms' own fund-close posts show what such announcements state, size and thesis, and what they omit.
Crunchbase counted $51 billion into European startups in 2024; Invest Europe counted 18 billion euros in venture alone.
The British Business Bank counts smaller-business equity deals in pounds; Dealroom counts venture rounds in dollars.
Bain and IVCA counted a 2023 funding fall in dollars; SEBI counts a cumulative rupee total for registered funds only.
CB Insights measured deal-count declines and Crunchbase measured quarterly dollars, and the two do not convert.
PitchBook tracks capital raised by climate VC funds; CTVC tracks capital invested into climate tech companies.
A Crunchbase funding figure, an equal-weighted public index and an industry group's roster define biotech three ways.
CB Insights framed 2021 as a share-of-market record and 2024 as a seven-year low in absolute deals and dollars.
Crunchbase venture data shows a 2025 to 2026 surge, while a same-named private equity series fell over the same span.
AVCA and Crunchbase both report volatile regional totals concentrated in a small number of large rounds and countries.
PitchBook ranks by one primary industry per company while Crunchbase can expand categories editorially by keyword.
Three providers publish different venture totals from different rules for what counts, not different views of one true number.
A figure is only checkable once its provider, period, scope and revision state travel with it.
Concentration and deal count moved differently in 2021 and 2026, and provider data shows where the comparison breaks.
Provider benchmarks sample companies that closed a round, and the providers say so themselves.
Venture dollar figures are nominal and cross-border ones are converted; official series show how to adjust before comparing years.
The form's own fields, and one filed example, show what a Form D states and what it leaves out.
Provider revision notes and press standards bodies agree: silent fixes are not the same as labelled corrections.
Cap, discount, pool and preference are defined in the instruments themselves, not invented by the spreadsheet.
Announcement, Form D, provider entry and company statement can disagree, and a desk should check them in order.
Investors know what a market total measures, so a founder's deck should say so before they have to ask.
The 2012 statute created the 'emerging growth company' category immediately; a 2015 SEC rule shows how long full implementation of its other titles took.
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